Is borrowing with usury, writing its contract, and bearing witness to it prohibited in itself, or is it a prohibition of means? And is it permissible out of necessity if its prohibition is due to it being a prohibition of means?

The matters mentioned by the questioner as means of consuming usury are not permissible merely due to need, whether it is said that they are forbidden as means or as ends. This is because the Lawgiver explicitly stipulated their prohibition and emphasized it, thus classifying them as major sins. Those who engaged in them were cursed by the Messenger of the Lord of the Worlds. The Lawgiver did not differentiate between the consumer, the provider, the witness, and the scribe in the root of the sin; rather, He made them equal. Rulings established based on need do not contradict a text, but they do go against general principles and analogical reasoning. What is permissible due to need is only permissible in cases where there is a text or a practice that permits it, or where there is no text or practice concerning it, but there is no specific text prohibiting it, and it has a counterpart in Islamic law to which it can be assimilated. If something is specifically prohibited, need does not affect its prohibition. Therefore, it is not permissible to borrow with usury merely for marriage or buying a house, and other needs that generally do not reach the level of necessity.