How can we reconcile the jurists' justification of many rulings by "hardship" and the formulation of the rule "hardship brings ease," with the usulis (legal theorists) considering hardship an uncontrolled cause that cannot be used for justification, such as the attachment of travel concessions to travel itself and not to hardship?

The principle "Hardship brings ease" is one of the recognized jurisprudential maxims. Jurists have discussed hardship and how it is regulated. Al-Qarafi explained that the criterion for hardship that influences mitigation is based on the lowest degree of difficulty in that particular act of worship. Thus, any subsequent hardship, if equal to or greater than that initial hardship, is considered a cause for exemption. If it is lesser, it is not. An example of this is the discomfort caused by lice during Hajj, which permits shaving the head; any illness causing similar or greater discomfort would also permit it. Travel, by text, permits breaking the fast, and other hardships are measured against it.

As for the foundational scholars (Usuliyyun), their reasoning is based on the presumption of hardship (mazannat al-mashaqqa) rather than hardship itself, due to its lack of precision. As Al-Zarkashi mentioned in "Al-Bahr Al-Muhit," a hidden or outwardly imprecise attribute is considered by what is necessarily associated with it, which is the presumption (mazanna). For instance, hardship is intended, but it cannot be considered by itself because it is imprecise; therefore, it is considered by what necessarily accompanies it, which is travel.