How can the statement of Sheikh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah be correct, that matters of definitive proof, text, and consensus in fiqh are many times more numerous than matters of ijtihad and disagreement, while it is common knowledge that matters of jurisprudential disagreement outweigh those agreed upon?

Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah clarifies that most jurisprudential rulings are known (certain) and not speculative, contrary to the claim of the mutakallimun (theologians) who restricted knowledge to rational issues and assumed that jurisprudence is speculative. He explains that fiqh (jurisprudence) is more deserving of the name "knowledge" than kalam (theology), and the methods of fiqh are more deserving of being called "evidence" than the methods of kalam. He also mentions that issues which occur frequently and are needed by people are numerous, and are known through texts from the Qur'an, Sunnah, consensus (ijma'), or clear analogy (qiyas jali). As for controversial jurisprudential issues that require ijtihad, they are few, even if they appear numerous in books of fiqh.