What is the explanation of the rule "What probability has touched, inference is invalidated by it," with examples?

The rule "Narration of a situation, if probability enters it, clothes it in the garment of ambiguity and drops its inferential force" is attributed to Imam Al-Shafi'i. Its meaning is that a legal text becomes ambiguous when probabilities within it are equal, or when there are actual events that admit specification. On the other hand, "Leaving the details in the narration of a situation, despite the existence of probability, is akin to generality in speech and allows for inference," and this indicates that a weak probability does not affect the indicative force of the evidence, otherwise all evidence would fall due to the entry of probabilities into it.

A distinction is made between the two rules: the first applies to actual events that admit ambiguity, while the second applies to verbal statements that carry a general meaning. The probability that necessitates ambiguity is the equal or predominant probability, not the weak one. Likewise, if the speech of the Lawgiver allows for two interpretations equally, it becomes ambiguous. However, if the wording is explicit in a genus or a clear text, this does not undermine its indicative force, even if it fluctuates between its types and individuals.

Therefore, the first rule applies when probabilities are equal in the Lawgiver's speech, while the second applies when probabilities relate to the subject matter, not the evidence, and leaving the details is considered a form of generality. The intended probability is not a mere abstract rational probability, but rather a probability added to a real-world matter, otherwise, it would lead to the rejection of most Sharia (definition) rulings.