Does the oath sworn by a man concerning his wife, that she is forbidden to him if she mentions a certain subject, take effect if he subsequently gives her permission to mention it?

It has been previously clarified that a man's statement to his wife, "You are unlawful to me," is among the allusive expressions that require intention. If he intended divorce, or ẓihār, or īlāʾ by it, then what he intended occurs. So, if you intended the unlawfulness to be a conditional divorce or a conditional ẓihār, then what you intended occurs upon your wife's action of the condition. Thus, if your wife spoke about the matter you intended, divorce or ẓihār occurs upon her, and not merely by your permission. Your permission for her to speak is of no benefit and does not prevent the occurrence of what you intended, whether divorce or ẓihār, when you made the condition. If you did not intend divorce or ẓihār, then you owe an expiation for breaking an oath. All of this is provided that you did not intend, at the time of uttering the statement, that your wife should not do that at a specific time. But if you intended that she should not do that for a certain period and that she may do it afterward, then the intention is what matters, for intention here specifies the general and restricts the absolute.